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Do Parents Buy Their Children‘s Attention?
Abstract
Past empirical studies on the strategic bequest motive have found evidence for the 
existence of a positive causation of wealth on receiving attention from one’s chil-
dren. This paper illustrates that these results from the past should be interpreted with 
some care as the relationship between wealth and children’s attention is sensitive 
to the type of ﬁ  nancial variable used in the analysis. Only family characteristics are 
signiﬁ  cant determinants of contact behavior. Turning to more serious types of physi-
cal needs, care behavioral regressions illustrate that mobility constraints like house 
ownership for parents or job and location restrictions for children hamper informal 
care provision by one’s children.
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1 Introduction 
The strategic bequest motive, as formulated by Bernheim et al. (1985), explains why 
parents hold more bequeathable wealth than would be expected under the life-cycle 
hypothesis. The authors’ interpretation of this finding is that parents do so to buy more 
attention and affection from their children than they would usually receive if they did not have 
anything to bequeath. Furthermore, the theoretical model assumes that parents threaten to 
disinherit their children if they do not comply with the parent’s wishes and that this threat is 
only credible if there are at least two children in the family.  
Bernheim et al. (1985) and Angelini (2007) find that parents who own higher amounts 
of bequeathable wealth have more attention to their children. Although this might seem of 
minor importance as the authors look at the general frequency of contacts between parents 
and their children, it becomes a problem when more serious forms of relationships, like 
caregiving for parents, are considered. Attention by contact is something parents may want to 
receive but care and help are things they might need later in life. This has not only financial 
consequences within families due to the high costs of professional care. Several empirical 
studies for the U.S. have shown that informal care by family members is less expensive to 
Medicare and Medicaid than formal care by professional services or nursing homes (van 
Houtven/Norton 2004). Also in Europe, most care policy regimes emphasize the prerogative 
of informal care in contrast to formal care services to relief government budgets (Federal 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (ed.), 2008). 
Therefore, my focus is to examine if the average parent–child relationship is as selfish 
as the prediction of the theory of strategic bequests. The issue of deviations from the life-
cycle model is more competently discussed elsewhere (Menchik/David, 1983). First of all, 
one has to keep in mind that the econometric model used by the aforementioned authors and 
myself is not able to explain if parents intend to bequeath their wealth strategically as we do 
not have direct information on their motive. However, a positive causal effect of bequeathable 
wealth on contact behavior of children could either imply that attention can be bought by 
wealthier parents and that children indeed have a price for which they are willing to sell it or 
that financially better off families have closer family ties than others have.  
After analyzing the contact behavior, which asks for visits, phone, and e-mail contact, 
I replace the dependent variable contact with a dependent variable which indicates if the 
parent(s) receive (physical) care or help by the respective child. If care/help provision by 
children is positively influenced by their parent’s bequeathable wealth, the current discussion 5 
on how to address the expected lack of informal carers in the future becomes even more 
difficult for people who have no or only small amounts of bequeathable wealth. In addition, 
society could be affected through a low level of caregiving by families as this is the cheapest 
form of care for public spending. 
Like Angelini (2007), I am using SHARE data for my analysis. Contrary to her study, 
panel data is available and I, thus, can control for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, I use a 
different contact measure and include additional financial variables into the regression model. 
I formulate somewhat different hypotheses of where to find the largest effects of bequeathable 
wealth on attention. Most importantly, I employ listwise deletion in dealing with missing 
financial variables while Angelini (2007) uses imputation methods.  
The results illustrate that this makes a considerable difference as the relationship 
between wealth and children’s attention is sensitive to the type of financial variable used in 
the analysis. Only family characteristics are significant determinants of contact behavior. 
Turning to more serious types of physical needs, care behavioral regressions illustrate that 
mobility constraints like house ownership for parents or job and location restrictions for 
children hamper informal care provision by one’s children. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes previous literature on 
strategic bequests and related pieces of evidence on inter-vivo transfers and care services by 
children. Section 3 introduces the data set, the methodology as well as some descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical model. Afterwards Section 5 discusses the results 
and the consequences of using imputed values. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature review 
Econometric analyses of the strategic bequest motive were conducted by Bernheim et 
al. (1985), Perozek (1998), and Angelini (2007). Bernheim et al. (1985) used a pooled data set 
which contained three years of the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS) from the 
1980s. They look at married couples with at least one child and estimate weighted OLS and 
2SLS regressions. The continuous dependent variable contact is an attention index calculated 
from on ordinal question on its frequency and the number of children the parent has. The main 
regressors of interest are bequeathable financial wealth and bequeathable real wealth. The 
authors find a positive significant effect of bequeathable wealth on attention and, therefore, 
evidence for the strategic bequest motive. However, in 1998, Perozek illustrates that this 
result is not robust to different definitions of the dependent variable attention index. Going 6 
further, she uses data from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) which, in 
contrast to Bernheim et al.’s (1985) data, also contains information on children. The inclusion 
of children’s characteristics diminishes the effect bequeathable wealth has on attention and 
indicates that these variables are important determinants of contact behavior. The latest study 
was conducted by Angelini in 2007 with the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which contains data on ten European countries. Like Perozek 
(1998), she also follows the examination procedure of Bernheim et al. (1985). Her results 
strongly confirm the strategic bequest motive. The wealth effect is, however, affected by 
housing wealth and not by financial wealth.  
All authors distinguish between those children who still have two alive parents living 
together (referred to as couples in the following) and those who have parents living on their 
own (referred to as single parent in the following). The reason for this distinction lies in 
inheritance law: The most likely heir of a single or lone parent is the child. The surviving 
spouse of parents, who still lived in a partnership before death, is going to inherit the largest 
part of the deceased’s wealth in most Western countries. The incentive of the child to provide 
contact is, therefore, smaller in the sample where both parents are still alive. In contrast, 
single parents might rely more heavily on attention and help by their children who, therefore, 
have much more to lose under the threat of disinheritance. 
A more direct approach to bequest motives finds that a substantial part of parents 
make equal bequests to their children. A descriptive analysis by Light/McGarry (2003) shows 
that an overwhelming part of a sample of mothers from the National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS) plans to divide their estate equally among their children, while only 8 percent intends 
to make unequal bequests. When asked for reasons for treating children differently, exchange 
motives have a relative importance of 25 percent. Menchik (1980) and Wilhelm (1996) used 
data which only contained the upper tail of the bequest distribution and found that a large 
fraction of their samples receive an equal share of the estate (62.5 percent and 68.6 percent 
exactly equal bequests, respectively). The analysis by Kopczuk/Lupton (2005) is in line with 
these findings. They illustrate that parents who are wealthier and more educated have a lower 
probability of having a bequest motive. Another study by Tomes (1981) suggests that an 
inheritance is used to compensate differential human capital investments in children in the 
past and that this leads to unequal bequests. However, Menchik (1988) says that the data used 
by Tomes (1981) suffers from measurement error as he only includes self-reported 
information on bequests. Therefore, he read the wills of the participants in Tomes’s sample 7 
and found that only 5 in 115 cases gave an explanation for an unequal bequest that goes in 
line with the strategic bequest motive (Menchik, 1988). Finally, the analysis by 
Behrman/Rosenzweig (1998) shows, using the Minnesota Twin Survey, that siblings do not 
visit their parents equally but receive equal bequests. Overall, Arrondel/Masson (2002) 
conclude in a detailed literature review on models of family transfers that the results in the 
literature on strategic bequests heavily depend on the data set which is used.  
Next to bequeathable wealth, parents could use monetary gifts to “pay” their children 
for services they provided to them (Behrman/Rosenzweig, 2004). In fact, unequal transfers 
are more often observed than unequal bequest. One possible explanation is given by 
Bernheim/Severinov (2000), who state that unequal bequests are more easily observed by all 
children while unequal inter-vivo transfers are not, a view that is also shared by 
Light/McGarry (2003) and Norton/van Houtven (2006). The incidence of inter-vivo transfers 
is, however, low: Attias-Donfut et al. (2005) as well as Albertini et al. (2007) both conducted 
a detailed descriptive analysis of time and financial transfers in SHARE data. Higher income 
of donors leads to higher transfers in Attias-Donfut et al.’s (2005) sample. Co-residence with 
other family members has a negative effect on receiving a transfer. Albertini et al. (2007) 
stress that this is particularly true for Southern European countries. They add that only the 
likelihood of receiving a transfer is economically relevant but not the amount given by the 
donor. In addition, it is important to note that the social support received from children is also 
increasing with the monetary transfer amount given to them (Albertini et al., 2007). The 
mechanism of the strategic bequest motive might, therefore, hold for inter-vivo transfers.  
A few studies looking at the relationship between care giving and bequests have been 
conducted so far. Norton/van Houtven (2006) estimate that parents who give inter-vivo 
transfers are more likely to transfer money to children who provide informal care than to 
those who do not. On the other hand, informal care has no influence on the parent’s plan to 
bequest their wealth equally among their children. Callegaro/Pasini (2007) simultaneously 
examine the health perception of elderly parents and the care giving decision of children with 
the first SHARE wave. They include parent’s real wealth in their analysis but cannot find a 
positive marginal effect of wealth on informal care giving. In addition, their results show that 
care giving by siblings is not a complement but a substitute which contradicts the theoretical 
effect of a bequest rule. In another SHARE analysis on the substitutability of informal and 
formal care, Bonsang (2008) notes that wealthier parents receive less informal care while 
home owners get more. In a detailed literature review, Arrondel/Masson (2002) conclude 8 
from past empirical evidence that helpers have not received more transfers than non-helpers 
and that the parents that are cared for have actually lower income and wealth than those who 
do not receive help.  
3 Data and methodology 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a 
multidisciplinary panel database of micro data on health, socioeconomic status and social as 
well as family networks of more than 30,000 individuals aged 50 and over.
1 The first and 
second waves were collected in 2004 and 2006 in up to fourteen European countries. The 
panel structure of the data set can be used since the end of 2008. Due to the research topic in 
this paper, a balanced panel is used. Thus, I delete observations from some countries available 
in SHARE.
2
3.1 Sample structure 
The original units of observation in SHARE are the parents
3. Questions for up to four 
children are answered by a family respondent of a couple or by a single with children. It is 
therefore necessary to merge the child information to the other parent for some cases and to 
assume that the children’s naming by the respondent is at random. To analyze the behavior of 
children, this data set is then reshaped so that the units of observation are children (child-level 
file) with the information on their parents attached to them. To avoid double counting of 
children, the youngest parent is kept if both parents are interviewed as (s)he might have a 
lower mortality risk. Before reshaping the data, some characteristics of two living parents 
have to be aggregated to make sure that the characteristics of both are connected to the 
respective child. I use different samples for children whose parent(s) are single (separated, 
divorced, or widowed) or living as couples. The descriptive analysis also shows the 
differences between the distribution of bequeathable wealth between individuals with and 
without children. 
As far as the expected effects due to inheritance law are concerned, I let go of the 
assumption that the strategic bequest motive is strongest for families with at least two children 
and include only children into my analysis. Using intestacy as a benchmark, an only child 
                                                     
1 For details on the sampling procedure, questionnaire contents and fieldwork methodology, readers are referred 
to Börsch-Supan et al. (2005). 
2 Denmark, Sweden, Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Israel participated in the first wave. The Czech Republic and Poland joined SHARE in the second one. As Israel 
has not been surveyed for the second wave yet, its respondents from the first wave as well as those from the 
Czech Republic and Poland have to be dropped from the data set. 
3 Several generations can be distinguished in SHARE. An individual older than 50 years is asked for information 
on himself, his parents, and his children. I therefore use the individual who answered the questionnaire and the 
information he gave on his children.   9 
forgoes relatively more inheritance than children who have brothers and sisters. Their legal 
portion is larger as if it has to be shared with siblings. Therefore, contrary to Bernheim et al.’s 
(1985) theory, the strongest wealth effects in the regression results are supposed to be found 
for singles when only children are included into the sample. 
3.2 Dependent variables 
Contrary to Bernheim et al. (1985), Perozek (1998), and Angelini (2007), I do not 
calculate a linear attention index. I condense the available categorical information from seven 
different attention categories to a binary dependent variable which is equal to 1 if the parent 
has contact with the child for at least once a week (intensive contact) and 0 if contact is less 
(ranging from every two weeks to never). I have to accept this information loss to be able to 
estimate panel data models.
4 Like in previous studies, the original question asks for visits as 
well as telephone calls and e-mail contact in one single variable. It is, therefore, likely that the 
dependent variable overvalues the satisfaction that parents receive from this attention 
measure. 
 In the second regression part of this paper, I look at the results when receiving help 
from a child is the binary dependent variable. It takes on the value 1 if a parent receives help 
in Activities of Daily Living (ADL: personal physical care like dressing, bathing, eating, 
using the toilet, getting in or out of bed), Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL: 
practical household help like home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, household 
chores) or paperwork (like settling financial or legal matters) from outside or inside its own 
household. Contrary to the attention measure above, physical contact is necessary in all these 
categories. 
3.3 Independent variables  
The paper uses several parental wealth measures which are calculated from the 
original answers of the respondents. I do not use imputed values but drop those observations 
with missing data in the variables of interest. The singles sample comprises 1,894 parent-child 
pairs while 5,804 observations are left for the analysis of the couples sample. Bequeathable 
wealth is divided into two different measures: financial wealth includes all kinds of savings 
that are asked for in the SHARE data set. These are savings, bonds and stocks, life insurance, 
bequeathable private retirement accounts, mutual funds, and contractual savings. The main 
component of real assets is housing wealth next to other real estate, the value of cars, and the 
                                                     
4 Variation in contact over the two available waves of SHARE is too small to estimate conditional fixed-effects 
models. 10 
value of a business share. Debt and/or mortgages are subtracted in both wealth measures. 
Contrary to the previous literature, I distinguish between inter-vivo transfers given to the 
respective child as well as between public and private annuity wealth.
5 Public annuity wealth 
should not have any influence on contact as it cannot be inherited by children. The same is 
true for private annuity wealth. However, its effect on contact could also turn out to be 
negative if parents shift their finances from bequeathable to non-bequeathable financial 
components to dispossess their children from a higher inheritance. Inter-vivo transfers from 
parents to their children could serve a similar purpose as a bequest and could have advantages 
for both parties: First of all, children could save inheritance tax, and possibly the overall 
family could also save income tax if children underlie a lower tax rate. Second, children could 
have a higher utility of additional money when they are younger. Expenditure on human 
capital investment or starting a family is a high financial burden as this usually occurs when 
the children’s own income is still low. A bequest, however, can be expected to occur much 
later in life when the children’s financial position is already consolidated. Thus, inter-vivo 
transfers can also be used strategically. All financial variables are measured in million euros. 
In addition, I weight financial and real wealth by the number of children in the family.  
As far as severe physical limitations and special needs of parents are concerned, the paper 
uses aggregated ADL and IADL measures over all parents that are still living together to 
identify care needs. In addition, several other control variables are included into the regression 
equation. Gender, age, being retired or self-employed, and the number of children are 
included as additional parental characteristics. Furthermore, information on gender, age, 
marital and employment status as well as distance, co-residence, the number of children and a 
dummy that indicates if the respective child is an only child are additionally available 
regressors for up to four children of the respective parent.  
3.4 Descriptive statistics  
To get an idea of the theoretically expected effects for the couples and singles sample, 
I compare descriptive statistics of parents and non-parents before I turn to estimating effects 
for parents in a regression analysis.
6 This section also gives an overview of the distribution of 
financial variables. The descriptive statistics of all other variables can be found in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. 
                                                     
5 Public annuity wealth comprises public and occupational pensions as well as war pension, alimony and 
payments from charities. Private annuity wealth consists of private annuities/private personal pension as well as 
life insurance and private health insurance payments. 
6 The respondents without children must of course be excluded from the regression analysis as they cannot be 
added to the child-level file. 11 
Bequeathable wealth is a composition of financial assets and real assets which mainly 
consists of housing wealth. Parents in the couples sample have a higher amount of wealth in 
each of the categories than non-parents, a finding that is expected under the strategic bequest 
motive. The picture is reversed for the single sample which might indicate that single parents 
have more difficulties in accumulating wealth compared to single non-parents as well as to 
parents living as couples.
7
In the following figures, I divided the original seven-point scale information of contact 
into three different groups to illustrate the distribution of the mean values of monetary 
variables in thousand euros per child over different intensities of contact behavior.  
Figure 1: Distribution of wealth by contact – singles 
SHARE 2004, 2006, weighted averages
Figure 2: Distribution of wealth by contact – couples 
SHARE 2004, 2006, weighted averages
                                                     
7 This should especially be true for those parents who raised their children alone or who have divorced or 
separated from their partner. In addition, it is not very likely that this effect stems from dissaving as the 
































































































































































Figure 1 for the lone parents and figure 2 for the parents living as couples present a picture 
that can be expected under the strategic bequest motive. The mean values of wealth variables 
are higher when parents have more contact to their children. Bequeathable wealth could thus 
serve as an incentive for children to stay in close touch. Inter-vivo transfers to children were 
given by 16.95 percent of single parents and by 21.62 percent of couples. The pooled mean 
transfer amount is about 2,699 and 4,044 euros on average per year. This is 45.77 percent and 
15.05 percent of mean financial wealth, respectively. 
In summary, one can say that although children of single parents have more to lose if 
they fall back on intestacy or are disinherited, the overall wealth of parents living in couples is 
much larger. A larger wealth effect for the couple sample is likely although theory predicts a 
larger one for single parents. However, the incidence of inter-vivo transfers may be too low 
compared to the wealth measures to discover their possible strategic usage.  
4 Empirical method 
The re-definition of the originally asked contact variable with its seven categories to a 
binary variable of intensive versus less intensive contact comes along with some information 
loss. However, this is necessary to exploit the advantages of panel-data models. Although an 
ordered probit/logit fixed-effects model would be the first choice for panel estimation, there is 
not enough variation in the sample’s dependent variable over the two available SHARE waves 
to receive reliable estimates. Therefore, I estimate binary logit random-effect models. The 
random effect represents individual differences in the overall mean attention level after 
controlling for the independent variables. The analyses, therefore, account for unobserved 
heterogeneity which can have a substantial impact in empirical research related to family 
relationships. To facilitate comparisons with past studies on strategic bequests, I also present 
cross-sectional logit results for 2004 and 2006, separately. 
The three previous empirical studies on the strategic bequest motive have pointed out 
that bequeathable wealth could induce an endogeneity problem. On the one hand, the 
argument is that parents who love their children more than other parents do, ceteris paribus, 
want to hold more wealth. On the other hand, children who feel more affectionate to their 
parents than other children do, ceteris paribus, are less likely to object to more contact with 
them. Bernheim et al. (1985) instrumented bequeathable wealth with lifetime earnings. 
Perozek (1998) concentrates on the total based socioeconomic index (SEI) from 1985 which 13 
ranks occupations by the primary job’s income.
8 Angelini (2007) also uses instruments 
namely the parent’s education and, in addition, the number of rooms of the parent’s house as a 
measure for the standard of living of the family. Although all of these variables are likely to 
be highly correlated with bequeathable wealth, none of the authors can plausibly argue that 
the instruments are not correlated with the attention measure. Higher lifetime earnings of 
parents might stem from higher education which increases their wage level. The parent’s 
education however is agreed to be an important determinant of their children’s education, 
which is again correlated with the children’s wage. Children with higher wages could either 
provide less attention because their opportunity costs are, ceteris paribus, higher than those of 
other children which earn less or they could be able to visit their parents more often as they 
can afford to travel more easily. Another possibility is that parents with higher lifetime 
earnings pay the children’s travel costs. The same argument holds for the socioeconomic 
index used by Perozek (1998) and for the parent’s education. Furthermore, the number of 
rooms in the parent’s house could be correlated with contact as children can be 
accommodated more easily. Younger children, particularly, might still have their nursery in 
the parent’s house. However, I do not have better instruments than the ones mentioned here 
and, therefore, refrain from using them altogether as weak instruments can amplify the bias 
from an endogeneity problem even further (Cameron/Trivedi, 2005). 
In the regression equation employed in this paper, even more explanatory variables are 
endogenous. These are, next to bequeathable wealth private annuity wealth and inter-vivo 
transfers. I instrumented private annuity wealth with the (former) responsibility for employees 
and inter-vivo transfers with the reason why an intergenerational monetary transfer was given. 
Employees with higher responsibility might be more aware of the advantages that voluntary 
private annuity savings can provide in later life than other employees because these assets 
require some financial literacy. Contact, however, is not directly affected by responsibility of 
parents at work. The reason for giving a gift is asked in the SHARE questionnaire. I create a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if there is no special reason for the transfer and 0 if parents 
have a special reason for it. The argument that the reason for giving a transfer is not correlated 
with contact is weak though because it is difficult to distinguish between altruistic and 
exchange motives among the available choice categories. The relationship with wealth is also 
low as the mean of transfer amounts is low as well. Overall, both instruments are problematic 
especially because the incidence of both exogenous variables is low in general. The F-tests of 
cross-sectional GMM estimation indeed illustrate that these instruments are not reliable 
                                                     
8 For more details, see Perozek (1998). 14 
enough. I am, therefore, not able to solve the endogeneity problem. The results presented 
below are not reliably interpretable as causal. 
In the following, I only discuss the cross-sectional and panel random-effect logit 
results for the different samples of parents. The effects of OLS estimations are attached in the 
appendix in Tables A2 and A3. 
5R e s u l t s  
Table 1 presents the significant individual marginal relations of the cross-sectional and 
panel random effect logit results for the contact behavior regression. The table indicates that 
the results of this study strongly deviate from the ones of Bernheim et al. (1985), Perozek 
(1998), and Angelini (2007) with respect to the coefficients of financial and real wealth.  
Table 1: Contact behavior regression 













Financial assets in million per 
child 
0.568 -0.063 0.023 0.003 0.145 0.028 
(0.447) (0.461) (0.346) (0.005) (0.127) (0.053) 
Real assets in million per child  0.221 0.048 -0.018 0.051 -0.003 0.005 
(0.481) (0.068) (0.114) (0.042) (0.010) (0.027) 
Average public annuity in 
million euros 
-0.029
* 0.062  0.006  0.000 -0.021 0.000 
(0.015) (0.055)  (0.01)  (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) 
Average private annuity in 
million euros 
0.016 0.019 0.022  -0.023
* 0.025 -0.008 
(0.077) (0.287) (0.098) (0.012)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Inter-vivo transfer to the child 
in thousand euros 
0.009 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parent is female  0.099
** 0.101
**  0.105 0.013 0.012 0.012 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.066) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.01) 




(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 






(0.042) (0.042) (0.058) (0.025) (0.024)  (0.02) 







(0.063) (0.059)  (0.09)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) 






(0.047) (0.046) (0.063) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 




(0.042) (0.043) (0.051) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Between 100 and 500 km away  0.049 0.046 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.028
*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) 
Co-residence  0.222
*** 0.212
*** 0.104  -  0.150
*** 0.064
***
(0.070) (0.064) (0.067)  -  (0.033) (0.022) 
Observations  947  947  1894 2902 2902 5804 
Chi  squared  106.205 121.753  73.654  304.621 342.323 245.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
Cross-sectional logit models and panel logit, re model presents individual marginal effects. 
SHARE 2004, 2006.15 
Neither financial nor real wealth has a positive significant relation to receiving 
attention from children for single parents. Therefore, I do not find evidence for the strategic 
bequest motive as Bernheim et al. (1985), Perozek (1998) or Angelini (2007) do. Public 
annuities are negatively related to contact in the cross-sectional regression of 2004 which is 
not in line with my argument in the introduction. However, the result is not robust and its 
economic importance is negligible. Private annuity wealth as well as inter-vivo transfers show 
no relation to providing attention at least once a week. In contrast to the financial variables, 
some parent and child characteristics have a significant impact on intensive contact to single 
parents. If the parent is female, the probability of close contact increases by about ten 
percentage points but only in the cross-sectional models. A female child increases this 
probability in the same models by nine percentage points. Thus, there seem to be closer ties 
between mothers and their daughters. The distance dummies have the largest impact on 
intensive attention. Co-residence has the largest positive effect in the cross-sectional results. It 
makes it 22 percentage points more likely to have contact for at least once a week with a lone 
parent. This relation does, however, not prevail when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into 
account. Living up to 5 km away from the parent’s residence increases the probability of 
contact by about 21 percentage points compared to living more than 500 km away. The 
likelihood decreases to about 11 percentage points for a distance of 5 to 25 km. The relation is 
insignificant for distances longer than 25 km compared to those over 500 km. As far as the 
panel random-effect results are concerned, only living up to 5 km away from one’s parents 
has a significant positive effect on contact of 16 percentage points. The reason for this could 
lie in the rough contact measure which not only includes visits but also phone calls and e-mail 
contact. There is, of course, no reason why contact in these latter two categories should be any 
different dependent on the distance to the parent’s place of living. 
Like in the single sample, neither financial nor real wealth is significant in the couples 
sample for all estimated logit models. As far as the other financial variables are concerned, 
only private annuity wealth is negatively related to contact in 2004. The relation is not 
economically important though. Again, only the parent and child characteristics have a larger 
significant impact on the probability of having contact for at least once a week. Having an 
additional child decreases the probability of this amount of attention by about three 
percentage points in the panel regression results. This implies that children act as substitutes 
or do not compete against each other. This result is somewhat surprising under the strategic 
bequest motive. One would think that children whose parents have a high amount of 
bequeathable wealth would try to outperform their siblings in providing contact to parents. 16 
However, it could also be the case that parents with more than one child might demand 
relatively less attention from a respective child when other siblings are around. In addition, 
the relative threat point for siblings is also lower as their legal portion decreases with the 
number of brothers and sisters. Like in the single sample, further results illustrate that having 
a female child increases the probability of intensive contact by up to five percentage points in 
the panel regression results. Furthermore, the distance dummies are significantly positive 
again. Contrary to the single sample panel results, the distance dummies for a distance of 5 to 
25 km as well as the one for 25 to 100 km is significant while their influence is monotonically 
decreasing. Co-residence has again a significantly positive effect on intensive contact from 
children. Contrary to the single parent sample, individual differences in contact behavior 
prevail in the panel results. 
Country dummies are included in all regression equations. I use the usual 
classification
9 into Northern, Central and Southern European countries to capture country 
differences which might stem from traditional family relationships as well as from 
institutional differences. The impact on intensive contact is mostly highly significant at the 1-
percent level. The contact probability for Northern and Central countries is lower than for 
Southern countries which are the reference group here. The contact probability for Central 
countries is even less than the one for Northern ones. To distinguish even better between 
European countries, single country dummies have been included into the regression function 
as a robustness check. This shows that closer contact in the Southern group is mainly driven 
by Greece whose citizens have a 19 percentage point higher probability of intensive contact to 
single parents than German parent-child pairs. However, this is also true for Sweden (14 pp) 
which belongs to the Northern country category. For the couple samples not only Greece (~8 
pp) but also Italy (~6 pp) show stronger family ties among Southern countries. Living in 
Sweden is again positively related to parent-child contact. The negative effect of belonging to 
the Central country group in the couple sample compared to the Southern country group is 
mainly due to the large negative effect of 15.3 percentage points that a Swiss citizenship has 
on parent-child attention.
10
                                                     
9 The classification is as follows: Northern countries: Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands; Central countries: 
Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland; Southern countries: Italy, Spain, Greece. 
10 The results are available from the author on request. 17 
5.1 Comparison to previous results - imputed values vs. listwise deletion 
The coefficients of the wealth variables are in sharp contrast to those of Angelini 
(2007) although she uses SHARE data reshaped into a child level data set as well. The main 
reason for these differences is the financial information that is employed. Angelini (2007) 
uses self-imputed wealth data to estimate her results while I make listwise deletion when 
respondents did not fill in the amount or bracket value. 
On the one hand, item non-response in the original financial asset variables from 
SHARE is only large for the value of saving and checking accounts where 23.5 percent either 
do not fill in the bracket values or directly refuse to answer. For all other financial variables 
employed here, this percentage is below 5 percent (Börsch-Supan/Jürges, (ed.), 2005). 
Nevertheless, the samples used in this paper are reduced by half because the missing value 
problem accumulates with the number of variables used. Fortunately, I am left with more than 
900 observations to conduct the analyses in this paper. But in general, multiple imputation 
could be used to obtain results if too few observations are left for analysis. On the other hand, 
it is said in the SHARE methodology that “there are substantial differences between the 
distribution of imputed values and the distribution of observed values” (Börsch-Supan/Jürges, 
(ed.), 2005, p.135). It is also pointed out that this can be the case if missing values do not 
occur at random (missing at random or MAR). In the present case, the MAR assumption 
would be violated if the distribution for those observations with missing data on the respective 
financial variable was significantly higher (or lower) than the distribution for those 
individuals with complete data on that variable, controlling for all other covariates. This 
assumption can obviously not be tested as the distribution of missing values is unknown. It is, 
however, widely accepted in econometric research that individuals with higher income or 
wealth are more likely to refuse answers on these questions which would lead to the 
conclusion that it is most likely that MAR does not hold for the financial variables used in this 
study. Allison (2001) states that “listwise deletion is the method that is most robust to 
violations of MAR among independent variables in a regression analysis” (p. 6) but not 
multiple imputation. If the probability of observing a missing value of a financial variable is 
independent of the values of the dependent variable intensive contact, the coefficients of the 
regression analyses will be unbiased. The mathematical proof can be found in Allison (2001, 
p. 87). To test if this is the case for the samples used here, I construct a dummy which is one 
if the value is missing and would, therefore, be deleted in my analysis (or imputed in 
Angelini’s case) and zero if it is non-missing. I then estimate a logit model of the binary 
missing value indicator on the variable intensive contact and test if its coefficient is 18 
significant. As this turns out to be the case, it is likely that the presented coefficients in this 
paper are biased. Nevertheless, if the reason for observing missing values in the regressors is 
their values itself, imputations cannot solve or mitigate this bias as well. 
Table 2 and 3 examine the consequences of using imputed values and, in addition, a 
continuous attention index to estimate strategic bequest behavior. All results are for 2004 only 
to make results comparable to Angelini’s (2007) results and as imputed SHARE data is not 
available for 2006 yet. Detailed results can be found in Table A4 and A5 in the appendix. The 
first three columns present the results for the econometric model specification used 
throughout this paper. The Table then further distinguishes between the results from non-
imputed data (as already shown in this section), imputed data for financial variables and, in 
addition, from using an attention index which is constructed as the one in Angelini’s (2007) 
paper. Table 3 shows these categories when I use Angelini’s econometric specification. The 
first column presents the coefficients with imputed values, the second one with non-imputed 
values and in the third one I exchange the attention index with the binary dependent variable 
intensive contact which I used so far. Unfortunately, I cannot fully re-produce the results 
presented in Angelini’s (2007) paper as I do not know how exactly she imputed missing 
data.
11 I, therefore, use the imputed values from SHARE to conduct the comparative analysis. 
It is interesting to note that the descriptive means of the imputed wealth measures from 
SHARE are higher than the one’s in my samples under listwise deletion. This would make 
sense if one assumes that individuals with higher income and wealth tend to refuse to answer 
these variables. Angelini’s (2007) imputed wealth measures have a lower mean than mine 
which is rather unexpected in the wake of this argument. However, in both imputed cases the 
respective standard deviations are lower as the variables’ distributions are smoothed by 
imputing data. 
                                                     
11 In addition, I refrain from using instrumental variable methods for estimation. 19 
Table 2: Comparison between imputed and non-imputed values in Meng’s (2009) specification 
























** -0.003  0.003  0.027  0.003 
(0.447) (0.071) (0.025) (0.005) (0.026) (0.017) 





(0.481) (0.061) (0.011) (0.042) (0.012) (0.003) 
Observations  947  8,590 8,590 2,789  15,101 15,101 
R-squared   0.478   0.496 
Chi squared  106.205  918.332  304.621  1,394.371  
SHARE 2004. Standard errors in parentheses, 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
Variables are measured in millions per child. 
Columns 1, 2, 4, 5 present individual marginal effects and are estimated with logit models. All other columns 
present OLS results. 
Table 3:  
Comparison between imputed and non-imputed values in Angelini’s (2007) specification 



































-0.004  -0.123 0.570 0.000 0.001 0.003 
(0.029) (0.133) (0.481) (0.019) (0.001) (0.006) 
Real assets   0.037
*** 0.071  0.162 0.009
*** 0.000  0.057 
(0.012) (0.144) (0.388) (0.003) (0.001) (0.048) 
Observations  8,038 877  877  14,058  2,752  2,752 
R-squared  0.436 0.461    0.482 0.509   
Chi squared     67.038     227.921 
SHARE 2004. Standard errors in parentheses; 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
Variables are measured in millions per child. 
Column 4 and 7 present individual marginal effects and are estimated with logit models. All other columns 
present OLS results.
If I use the average of the five imputed values from SHARE to impute missing wealth data, I 
indeed receive a significant positive coefficient for financial and real bequeathable wealth in 
million per child in the sample of single parents. When I estimate my model specification 
with imputed values and a continuous attention index by OLS, only real wealth remains 
significantly positive. Real wealth is also significantly positive in the sample of parents living 
as couples when I use imputed values and then, in addition, an attention index. Again, the 
economic significance of the coefficients further decreases. I find a similar development in 
the results when I re-estimate Angelini’s (2007) specification. When imputed values are used 20 
for the regression, real wealth still has the significantly positive effect in both samples. 
However, when I delete originally missing data, the effect becomes insignificant and much 
larger. In summary, using imputed values or listwise deletion has a substantial impact on the 
significance and the size of the coefficients in these analyses. The former case confirms the 
positive reaction of children to their parent’s wealth. The latter case can neither reject nor 
confirm this relation. 
5.2 Comparative care behavior regression 
Contact is something parents would like to get from their children. However, they 
could do without it physically. This might change when parents are in need of care or 
substantial help around the house or with other aspects of daily life like paperwork. Some 
parents might have a high enough regular income or enough wealth to pay for a professional 
to provide those services. However, a large part of individuals is likely to prefer care or help 
from close relatives whom they trust and whom they get along well with. Therefore, I 
exchange the dependent variable “intensive contact” with a binary variable which is equal to 
one if care or help is received from children who live in or outside the parent’s household. I 
expect to find either no relation of bequeathable wealth again or even a negative relation as 
wealthier parents could on the one hand afford professional service providers and, on the 
other hand, are more likely to have children whose opportunity costs of giving help 
themselves are high.  
The results that are presented in Table 4 are for comparative reasons to the usual 
strategic bequest regression function only. However, the model has obvious limitations in that 
it is unable to separately identify demand and supply effects. 21 
Table 4: Care behavior regression 













Financial assets in million 
per child 
-0.135 -0.900
* -0.687 -0.001  0.006  0.001 
(0.255)  (0.538) (0.530) (0.002)  (0.096) (0.031) 
Real assets in million per 
child 
-0.262 0.085
* 0.016 -0.022  -0.083 -0.022 
(0.278)  (0.048) (0.119) (0.017)  (0.059) (0.014) 
Present value of public 
annuity in million euros 
-0.003 -0.050  -0.006  -0.018
** 0.021
* -0.001 
(0.016)  (0.034) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.002) 
Present value of private 
annuity in million euros 
0.453
*** -0.122  0.397
*** -0.001  -0.008  -0.001 
(0.117)  (0.354) (0.154) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.003) 
Inter-vivo transfer to the 
child in thousand euros 
0.003 -0.003  0.002  0.000 -0.001  0.000 
(0.003)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 




** -0.001  -0.003 -0.001 
(0.038)  (0.035) (0.038) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.004) 




*** 0.455  -0.015  0.022  0.007 
(0.194)  (0.138) (0.287) (0.046)  (0.096) (0.063) 
Number of IADL help 
needed 
0.430
*** -0.135  0.186  0.085  0.066  0.055 
(0.162)  (0.134) (0.237) (0.099)  (0.096) (0.068) 
Only child 
-0.112
** -0.068  -0.080
* -0.026  -0.029
* -0.012
*
(0.049)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.007) 





* 0.031  0.025
*
(0.070)  (0.082) (0.099) (0.041)  (0.026) (0.015) 




* 0.052  0.022 0.017 
(0.064)  (0.073) (0.084) (0.038)  (0.026) (0.013) 
Between 25 and 100 km 
away 
0.076  0.120 0.129 0.068  0.001 0.014 
(0.068)  (0.078) (0.087) (0.045)  (0.024) (0.014) 
Between 100 and 500 km 
away 
0.010  0.079 0.038 0.008  -0.011  -0.002 




** 0.109  0.012  0.027 
(0.088)  (0.102) (0.136) (0.068)  (0.036) (0.024) 
Observations  947 933  1894 2902  2902 5804 
Chi squared  159.611 129.364  165.549 108.041  127.936 126.184 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01  
Cross-sectional logit models and panel logit, re model present individual marginal effects.
SHARE 2004, 2006. 
The bequeathable wealth relations for the logit models in Table 4 are quite inconclusive. 
Financial wealth only has a significant and negative effect for single parents in 2006. In the 
same specification, real wealth is positively related to the probability of receiving care/help. 
However, when one looks at the OLS results in Tables A6 and A7, financial wealth tends to 
be negatively related to providing care by children (A6) while real wealth is negative related 
to care/help giving for parents living as couples (A7). In a cautious interpretation, this might 
indirectly confirm a tendency of wealthier people to rely on professional help. Private annuity 
wealth tends to be positively related to contact for singles. Further analysis is needed to 
interpret this effect. The number of ADL in which help is needed has a positive effect in the 22 
cross-sectional single sample. IADL needs also show a positive effect for receiving care/help 
for single parents in 2004. In the couple sample, however, no explanatory power can be 
assigned to these two variables. Thus, these correlations are different compared to the contact 
regressions. In addition, there are other significant family characteristics in these analyses: 
Being a lone mother increases the probability of receiving care/help by 7.7 percentage points 
in the panel results. If a single parent has only one child, this probability decreases by 8 
percentage points. The effect is mitigated for parents living as couples to 1.2 percentage 
points. The positive effect of the distance dummies is mitigated, especially in the couples 
samples. This implies that non-physical contact like telephone calls which were included into 
the dependent contact variable were responsible for the high effects in these dummy variables. 
Receiving help is only restricted to physical contact though and the effect of distance is not 
capturing spurious regression anymore. As the significant relation prevails for distances up to 
25 km for parents who live alone, they seem to have more contact with children than couple 
parents. The effect of co-residence is strong and positive in the single sample. One reason for 
this finding might be that lone parents move together with their children when they are in 
need of care as long as the parent does not possess a substantial amount of wealth. Thus, the 
relation could be overestimated because of an endogeneity problem between these two 
variables. However, I do not go into more details here as I am interested in the wealth effects 
compared to the one’s in contact behavior. 
6C o n c l u s i o n  
The results of this study must be considered from several perspectives.  
From the contact behavior regression results, one can conclude that bequeathable 
wealth in financial or real asset form does not have a significant influence on attention that 
parents receive from their children. This is true for parents living as couples or alone. 
Whenever a significant financial variable coefficient is estimated, it can only be found in one 
of the two years in this study and it is always economically small. This is also true for public 
and private annuity wealth as well as for inter-vivo transfers. In addition, the relations are not 
economically important. Only family characteristics like the parent’s sex, as well as the sex of 
the child, the number of children of parents and the distance of the child’s residence are 
significant determinants of contact behavior throughout samples and econometric 
specifications.  
One can conclude that past studies on a strategic bequest motive have been too optimistic in 
finding the expected positive effect wealth is supposed to have on attention. The results in this 23 
analysis neither confirm nor reject the possibility of strategic behavior of parents. 
Nevertheless, the econometric model cannot say if parents act strategically in holding 
bequeathable wealth. It can only tell us if contact behavior provided by children is correlated 
with their parent’s wealth. However, as no valid and strong instruments are available for 
solving the endogeneity problem, this study as well as the ones of Bernheim et al. (1985), 
Perozek (1998), and Angelini (2007) have to be cautious in interpreting the results as causal 
effects. To get to know the motives of parents, direct questions on their reasons for holding 
wealth or on their intention to divide their wealth unequally among their children would be 
necessary. This data is, however, not available in SHARE. 
Several technical limitations of the strategic bequest analysis from the past could not 
be solved here. First, the dependent variable contact comprises physical and non-physical 
attention. This is not only distorting the distance measure. One would assume that physical 
contact is much more valued to telephone or e-mail contact by most parents. The transaction 
costs of non-physical contact are lower and, therefore, the “price” that children are paying to 
provide it is lower as well. Another shortcoming is the missing information on the children’s 
earnings and household income. Those who earn more might live farther away and be less 
constrained by travel costs but at the same time their opportunity costs are likely to be higher.  
I agree with Menchik (1980) that the rather inconclusive results are affected by the large 
variance of the wealth and annuity variables which is also true for my analysis. When I 
estimate the same model with imputed values from SHARE, the effects of real wealth in 
particular becomes significantly positive and smaller in magnitude. Therefore, using listwise 
deletion or imputed values can make a substantial difference for interpretation. The reason 
seems to be a smoother distribution of wealth variables when imputed values are used. 
Although employing one or the other technique is still an issue, Allison (2001) points out that 
listwise deletion is more robust than imputation if the reason for missing information in an 
independent variable is correlated with the variables that need to be imputed. 
In the third step of this paper, we have seen that the financial wealth variable in the 
care behavior regression tends to have a significantly negative influence on receiving care or 
help from children for lone parents. Its economic importance is small and has to be interpreted 
with some caution as this does not necessarily imply that they rely more on professional 
services than parents living still together. As real wealth mainly comprises housing wealth its 
positive coefficient might indicate that parents who live alone and own a house are less 
willing to move out of their homes which brings their children to help their parents more 24 
often. The effects of the distance dummies is also a measure of the children’s opportunity cost 
for providing care. Moving closer to the parent’s home might be difficult due to occupational 
reasons. A cautious policy implication from both behavioral regressions would thus imply that 
parents should rather invest in private annuity wealth than keep their money in bequeathable 
form. First, wealth does not influence their children in providing attention as we have seen in 
the contact behavior equation. Second, the literature on informal care provision suggests that 
parents might not be able to rely heavily on care or help provided by their children due to an 
unfavorable demographic development in Europe. Parents might also fear to be a burden to 
their children and prefer formal help. Professional services could also be of better quality 
which is especially true if children are rather reluctant to provide care or help. This could also 
be advantageous for children who have high opportunity costs to care for their parents. Private 
care insurance could, therefore, serve as a means to pay for professional services and mitigate 
care risk at the same time.  
Future research should try to give some answers to this quite speculative conclusion. One has 
to keep in mind that the above effects represent the market outcome of giving care to parents 
conditional on financial incentives (which might have been promised or given as a reward if 
parents want to influence their children strategically). It is necessary to disentangle the 
demand and supply effect which works behind this scene. An instrument that explains the 
demand of parents and which is as well highly correlated with their wealth has to be 
independent of the children’s supply of services at the same time. The parent’s health or 
disability status does not fulfill these characteristics.  
  25 
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